Analysis of P2P file sharing network's credit system for fairness management by Li, Yunzhao & Gruenbacher, Don M.
Analysis of P2P File Sharing Network’s Credit 
System for Fairness Management 
Yunzhao Li                                                    Don Gruenbacher
Electrical and Computer Engineering                                 Electrical and Computer Engineering   
      Kansas State University                                           Kansas State University 
yzli@ksu.edu                                                       grue@ksu.edu 
Abstract- Fairness is an important management issue for 
peer-to-peer file sharing systems. In this paper, we study the 
credit system of the P2P file sharing network eMule 
(http://www.emule-project.net) through a simple queueing 
network model. Numerical analysis and experimental results 
show that this local credit strategy could effectively deal with free 
riders and provide fairness for the system during a single file 
exchange. Using this model, we also investigate different 
management strategies for dealing with the newcomer fairness 
issue. We propose a simple, private history-based scheme to 
balance the fairness between two types of newcomers. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent popularity and success of peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
sharing has established its importance while also contributing 
a majority of the traffic on the Internet.  In contrast to the 
traditional client-server content distribution system, every 
member of a P2P file sharing network has an equivalent role. 
Not only can each peer download from other peers, but it is 
also responsible for uploading content as a server.  This often 
results in fairness issues as many peers called free riders may 
only want to download without uploading or sharing their own 
content. This paper evaluates the performance of two types of 
peers that are subjected to a fairness management policy 
which gives download priority to users who also upload their 
content to the network.   
The distributed architecture of a P2P system does not easily 
lend itself to control free riders in order to maintain fairness. 
In fact, as a somewhat autonomous system, the file sharing 
performance of a P2P network greatly depends on each peer’s 
cooperation. A peer should be willing to voluntarily donate 
resources in exchange for content that it would like from other 
peers. However, selfish peers exist who benefit from other 
peers’ contribution yet refuse to offer in exchange their own 
resources.  
Such selfish behavior will result in the eventual collapse of 
the whole system. In an attempt to dissuade this behavior, 
various incentive management strategies are introduced to 
current P2P file sharing networks to reward general peers 
which share their information and penalize free riders. For 
example, a BitTorrent client prefers to allocate upload 
bandwidth to peers who send data to it with a rate-based tit-
for-tat fairness policy [1]. Another fairness control strategy is 
to build a global trust management system, which could help 
peers choose their neighbors based on different trust levels. 
For example, in [2], the global reputation scores of all nodes 
in the current unstructured P2P network are collected, 
calculated, and then distributed in the whole system. 
Unlike the previous fairness policies, the eMule P2P file 
sharing application adopts a simple local trust system called a 
credit system to encourage peers to exchange information 
while restricting free riders. The eMule network is a local 
reputation system that only allows credit to be exchanged 
between the uploader and its downloader.  This is different 
from a global reputation system that allows credit to be 
exchanged among all peers. 
While almost all of the current P2P research contributes to 
multiple aspects of BitTorrent, eMule’s fairness issue is 
lightly addressed even though it significantly impacts whole 
system performance. Currently, global and public history-
based reputation approaches can be regarded as possible 
solutions for P2P network’s fairness management. However, 
compared to the complexity of the global system, the simple, 
local, and private history-based approach also needs to be 
carefully investigated. Therefore, the work presented here 
evaluates eMule’s local and private history-based credit 
system for maintaining fairness.   The primary contributions of 
this paper are: 
1) a simple queueing network model is developed to 
investigate the impact of credit on system fairness; 
both the numerical analysis and the experiments in the 
real world illustrate that even if the incentive algorithm 
is local-based, it can still deal with free riders and 
provide fairness during a single file exchange when 
compared to BitTorrent’s “TFT” incentive algorithm; 
2) our model is used to compare two different types of  
credit strategies for providing fairness to the newcomer. 
A simple, long-duration, and private history-based 
credit scheme is proposed which will better reward the 
generous newcomer while limiting the selfish free rider. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
important related work. In section 3, a queueing network 
model is presented to study the fairness of eMule. The 
numerical analysis and corresponding experiment results are 
shown in section 4. Section 5 discusses the newcomer 
management issue and an improved fairness design is 
presented for providing fairness to newcomers, followed by 
summary and future work in section 6. 
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II. RELATED WORK
There are a large number of publications related to various 
aspects of peer-to-peer file sharing such as performance, 
fairness, and security. The work in this paper is motivated by 
[3] and [4]. In [3], a mathematical model is developed for 
studying BitTorrent’s performance, and the authors find the 
distribution of download peers into the system takes the form 
of an asymmetric U-shaped curve. This means there are more 
peers blocked at the beginning and end segments of the 
download process than peers at the other download time 
period. In [4], a general stochastic analytic framework for 
incentive-based file-swarming research is proposed, and the 
first-chunk problem is also shown in the authors’ analytical 
bound and simulation result. The first-chunk problem is 
related to how the system manages newcomers for which a 
more detail discussion will be given in the following section. 
Other works are also given attention to P2P system fairness. 
In [5] and [6], game theory is used to investigate the 
relationship among peers. The fairness policy of a current 
peer-to-peer file sharing system such as BitTorrent is shown to 
not be robust in [7], and the free rider could obtain a higher 
download rate than a tit-for-tat compliant client [8]. In [2] and 
[9], global reputation approaches are suggested for dealing 
with free riders and malicious peers. However, reputation is 
always vulnerable when the free rider repeatedly changes its 
ID for additional benefit, or more than one free rider work 
together as a coalition [10]. Furthermore, because of the 
complexity of implementation, the global reputation approach 
hasn’t been popularly employed from existing P2P file sharing 
systems in the real world. 
Although BitTorrent has gathered more attention than 
eMule in the research community, there are a number of 
papers that do address eMule’s performance. In [11], a fluid 
model is developed for the analysis of a system like eMule, 
and an optimal upload strategy is given. In [12], the authors 
investigate file diffusion through an epidemic method, and the 
influence from corrupted files is shown. The projects in both 
[13] and [14] respectively measure P2P networks such as 
eMule from both the client viewpoint and the ISP’s viewpoint. 
The measurements include eMule’s traffic characterization, 
the whole system’s capacity, and sharing files’ distribution.  
III. QUEUEING NETWORK MODEL
A.   The eMule P2P File Sharing System 
As one of the most popular file sharing systems, eMule 
averages more than 2 million peers in the system during 
October 2005 [15]. It uses a hybrid architecture, which first 
obtains online sources information for its expected content, 
then employs multiple sources in downloading by dividing the 
whole file into equal-sized pieces called chunks. Through this 
scheme, more servers appear in the system at the same time to 
really enhance the system capacity.   
eMule employs an incentive fairness algorithm based on a 
local private history credit record to encourage uploading, 
which means the credit is used to reward  a peers’ sharing 
behavior and provide benefit for future downloading. For 
example, if peer A uploades a resource to peer B, peer B will 
give some credit to peer A, and this credit record is only held 
by peer B. When peer A later wants to download content from 
peer B, it will be given higher priority service from peer B 
than other neighbors of B without credit. Because credit 
rewards can only be exchanged between the downloader and 
its directed uploader, the credit information is not spread 
among other peers. Thus eMule’s credit is a local private 
history-based credit system and not a global public history-
based system like some kinds of social reputation networks. 
Compared with BitTorrent’s use of a simple accept or reject 
policy for each requester which is unfair for low-bandwidth 
users, eMule has implemented a complicated priority queue 
component to cache various requests independent of the 
customer’s upload bandwidth. The positions of peers in an 
eMule uploading queue are determined by their past credit 
from the service provider. Because the entire download 
process is chunk-based, and each chunk can be independently 
exchanged among peers, eMule’s credit operations naturally 
follow this exchange process. Moreover, the unconsumed 
credit will reside with peers for a long time period (several 
months) [17], and this credit can also be used for future file 
exchanges. 
B.   Mathematical Model 
We extend the established model in [3] [4] which only focus 
on the general behavior for P2P file sharing, and distinguish 
the peers into two types within the model: the general peer 
who obeys the incentive rule to download and upload, and the 
free rider who is the extreme malicious peer only downloading 
from others and refusing to contribute. Most general peers 
possess positive credit due to their incessant sharing behavior, 
and as long as a peer has credit, the amount of credit does not 
differentiate one peer from another.  
If a shared file has K chunks, the peer’s entire downloading 
progress could be described by the completion of a task for 
each chunk downloaded.  The file will be completely 
downloaded at the completion of the Kth task. A simple 
tandem queueing network that uses a total of K service 
workstations is suitable for modeling this process. The service 
station S1 can be explained as the location where the peer 
obtains its first chunk, and the service station S2 is the location 
where the peer obtains its second chunk, and so on. However, 
the order of the chunk in the whole file does not matter. For 
example, when a new peer arrives at the system to download a 
single file, it will send a request from its first service station S1
and participate in the uploading queue for S1. The peer’s 
queue position is decided by its credit previously earned from 
its current service providers. After a certain waiting time, it 
receives the uploading bandwidth and obtains its first chunk. 
As a result, it could provide upload service for other peers and  
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Figure 1. Queueing Network Model.  The general peer’s arrival rate is Ȝg, and 
the free rider’s is Ȝf. the general peers with chunks can provide upload 
bandwidth at classes C1, C2, …, and after downloading chunks at stations 
successively, the peers leave the system. The dash lines between the classes 
and the stations show the distribution of uploading bandwidth.  
earn credit B from them. When it begins to download the next 
chunk, the received credit B might help it obtain a high 
priority queue position from the uploading queues. Continuing 
with this process, earning credit from sharing and consuming 
credit from downloading, it will finally finish the entire file 
downloading process (Fig. 1). 
It is worth noting that in our model, each station’s service 
providers come from all the general peers having at least one 
chunk. Thus, we sort these peers into K-1 classes: class C1
representing peers having one chunk through class CK-1 which 
represents peers having K-1 chunks. Two uploading queues 
exist at each class, each with a different priority. During each 
time slot, the first peer in the service station’s high priority 
queue will be serviced at the station and complete one chunk’s 
downloading. If no peer exists in the high priority queue, the 
first peer in the low priority queue will be serviced. A general 
peer has a probability of joining the high priority queue if the 
server has previously received its service and assigned some 
credit to it, while a free rider will always stay in the low 
priority queue. Consequently, we map the service stations’ 
downloading queues to these classes of the peer’s high priority 
queue and low priority queue which the dashed lines represent 
between classes and service stations in Fig. 1. Based on the 
P2P file sharing system’s policy, general peers with i chunks 
always have two positions in our model: one is in the class Ci
to provide uploading service, the other is at service station 
Si+1’s downloading queue for waiting for the service. 
Table 1 shows our model parameters. Following the general 
assumption of the P2P arrival process used in [3] and [4], we 
use a Poisson process to model the general peer’s arrival rate 
Ȝg as well as the free rider’s arrival rate Ȝf. We assume that 
both types of peers have an equal upload rate ȝ and an equal 
download rate Ȟ. In P2P networks like eMule, a peer can 
obtain other peer information through different search 
methods such as index servers, source exchanges, and a 
Kademlia DHT network [17]. Thus, the assumption that peers 
know the other online peers’ connection information is 
rational. For simplicity reasons, it is also assumed that each 
peer cannot download the next chunk until it completes 
downloading the current chunk. In our model, peers are 
assumed to stay in the system during the download. However, 
they will leave the system immediately after receiving the 
complete file.  
Table 1: Queueing Network Model Parameters 
Parameters Meaning 
Ȝg the arrival rate of general peers 
Ȝf the arrival rate of free riders 
Gi(t)
the number of general peers having i-1 chunks at service 
staion i
Fi(t)
the number of free riders having i-1 chunks at service 
station i
K
total number of chunks in a file, it is equal to the total 
number of service stations in the queueing network 
ȝ peer’s average upload rate 
Ȟ peer’s average download rate 
Si service station i
Ci general peer’s class i
Hj the high priority queue size of class j
Lj the low priority queue size of class j
Rg(Si, Si+1)
general peers’ transfer rate from service station Si to 
service station Si+1
Rf(Si, Si+1)
free riders’ transfer rate from service station Si to service 
station Si+1
Because of its limited participation time and few shareable 
chunks, the general peer may only earn low credit at the 
beginning of downloading. Therefore, it has a low probability 
of obtaining better service from the beginning service stations. 
The effect of previously earned, long-term credit is ignored 
and will be explained in section IV. This will rapidly change 
as its sojourn time in the system increases and it has more 
chunks to share. Thus we adopt the exponential utility func-
tion to represent the probability Pr(i) that general peers at 
service station Si can enjoy the credit benefit: 
The distribution of requests among all classes uploading 
queues is now considered. Following [3], peers are considered 
that possess one or more chunks and have identified missing 
chunks at one or more peers.  The probability of joining class 
Cj’s uploading queue is calculated as follows: if peer A has i
chunks and requests the remaining K-i chunks from peer B at 
class Cj, the probability that peer B contributes to peer A is: 
Because each peer is assumed to know the file-swarm’s 
connection information, the normalized probability Pb(i,j) that 
r
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i
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it currently owns i chunks and belongs to class Cj’s uploading 
queue is: 
Now, we can respectively estimate the length of each class 
Cj’s uploading queue for both the high priority queue Hj and 
the low priority queue Lj:
                                                                                  
The upload rate ȝj of each class j is respectively assigned to 
both the high priority and low priority uploading queue with 
percentages of Ph(j) and Pl(j). Assuming peers in the low 
priority queue need to wait until all general peers in the high 
priority queue complete their downloading jobs, their received 
rates are 1/ Hj. These percentages are: 
                
Combining the above equations, we get the transfer rate 
formulas of two types of peers:  
(1) Rg1: general peers’ transfer rate from service station Si to 
service station Si+1 when they use their credit to join high-
priority queues. It is the summation of the upload bandwidth 
obtained from general peers at class C1 to general peers at 
class Ck-1.
(2) Rg2: general peers’ transfer rate from service station Si to 
service station Si+1 when they can’t use their credit and join 
the low-priority queues. 
(3) Rg: the total transfer rate of general peers from service 
station Si to service station Si+1 is: 
(4) Rf: free riders’ transfer rate from service station Si to 
service station Si+1 is: 
The departure rate of station Si is equal to the arrival rate of 
the state Si+1 followed the Markov Chain property [16]. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Numerical Analysis  
The mathematical model is intended to answer the question: 
is the credit system for eMule P2P systems suitable for 
maintaining system fairness and reducing the damage from 
free riders? For our model, the time slot is the time to finish 
one chunk downloading. We choose the value of K=25 to 
represent the general RMVB file (about 200 MB size in the 
P2P file sharing system, and a chunk’s size of 9.28MB). The 
value of ȕ=0.1 is used to calculate the probability Pc(i). The 
ratio of peer’s download rate Ȟ to its upload rate ȝ is chosen as 
0.1, which is the typical value for the current ADSL technique 
[19]. It is reasonable to believe that the majority of the peers 
in the P2P system are general peers, while it is still desirable 
to know the ability of credit to maintain fairness when 
different proportions of free riders are in the system. Thus we 
randomly generate the peers’ arrival rates through the Poisson 
distribution, and varied the ratio of general peers’ arrival rate 
to free riders’ Ȝg/Ȝf from 10, 2, 1, to 0.5.  Following the rule 
for the transfer rate between adjacent states (the state Si’s 
output rate is equal to the input rate of Si+1), a numerical 
analysis is run for the equations 10, 11 in our model until the 
system reached a stable state. 
Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) plot the variation tendency of the 
total population of the general peers and the free riders 
completing their jobs, respectively. Fig. 2(c) shows the ratio of 
finished general peers to finished free riders over time. The 
initial value of the numerical analysis introduces some 
fluctuation at the beginning period of Fig. 2(c). However, 
when the system reaches steady state, the number of finished 
general peers is much larger than the number of finished free 
riders, even when the general peer arrival rate is significantly 
smaller than the free rider arrival rate. The number of finished 
free riders decreases with the arrival ratio increment in Fig. 
2(b). The reason is that the increased arrival rate of the free 
riders produces more low priority bandwidth competition 
among themselves. Another notable issue is that the free rider 
could not get more benefit even though there is a higher 
arrival rate of general peers in the system as shown in Fig. 2(c) 
(the value of the finished peers’ ratio keeps about 20, while 
the arrival ratio is 10). This can be explained by the 
assumption that general peers will immediately leave the 
system when they finish the downloading. 
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The results indicate that the local private history-based 
credit strategy could effectively provide fairness for a single 
file exchange. A general peer could obtain a high-bandwidth 
reward to speed up its downloading process using credit 
exchange is expected, because it would re-access neighboring 
peers who build a credit relationship with it during the 
exchange process. In contrast, the free rider is just a 
beneficiary. Without any credit, it always belongs to the low 
priority queue with poor average uploading bandwidth.  
B. Experiment 
We employ an experimental study by using the test 
method in [7] [8]. Evaluating a P2P file sharing system like 
eMule in the real world is full of challenges. The evaluation 
tasks such as the entire system monitoring, collecting, and 
measuring are difficult to realize under the distributed and 
autonomous environment. In addition, the large number of 
online peers, the distinct behavior and motivations among 
different peers, the various client modifications of eMule’s 
official version, and the sharing contents’ popularity all limit 
the usability of current networking testbeds such as PlanetLab 
and network simulators like ns-2.  However, whether or not 
the eMule network is fair can still be judged from the peer’s 
viewpoint. For example, if a free rider obtained a similar 
download rate to that obtained by a general peer who followed 
the incentive strategy, it would be true that the system is unfair. 
Or, if the free rider’s downloading bandwidth is limited 
compared with the general peer’s, this would imply reasonable 
fairness. Our experiments focus on the downloading process 
of a single file, and the basic steps used to evaluate fairness 
are as follows:  
1) Two peers are introduced into the eMule’s Network: one is 
the general peer, and the other is the free rider. In our 
experiment, the free rider is an extremely malicious peer 
who will contribute nothing during its downloading process. 
The free rider is implemented by modifying one of eMule’s 
popular client versions, eMule v0.49C. An unmodified 
client represents the general peer, which is running with 
eMule’s recommended default configuration. The free rider 
and the general peer are running separately on two 
computers with the same configuration. 
2) These two clients join the same file-swarm at the same time, 
and leave the system when the downloading job is 
completed. The uploading and downloading bandwidth are 
unlimited. 
3) When the downloads are finished, the average download 
rate are calculated as: 
File Size
Average Download Rate
Download Time
=
In order to keep the experimental results accurate, different 
types of contents with different file sizes are selected as the 
downloading resources, and after each test, the general peer’s 
ID is randomly recreated to avoid the private history effect. 
The results are shown in Table 2:  
Table 2: The downloaded file size, the average download and upload rate of 
the general peer and the free rider, and the ratio of the general peer’s 
download rate to the free rider’s download rate in different experiments 
File Size 
(MB) 
Average Download Rate 
(KB/s) 
Average Upload Rate 
(KB/s) 
General 
Peer 
Free 
Rider 
Ratio General peer Free Rider 
114 34.34 14.69 2.34 264.86 0 
294 21.82 8.98 2.43 83.98 0 
524 25.57 2.22 11.52 240.50 0 
700 85.03 10.10 8.42 350.37 0 
1350 23.16 12.10 1.94 23.23 0 
The experimental results are greatly affected by the current 
number of seeds and peers in the system, the different upload 
and download bandwidth among a great number of general 
peers, and the obtained downloading bandwidth of free riders, 
etc. However, the results in Table 2 provide insight into the 
fairness policy of the eMule system, which emphasizes that 
the download rate of a free rider is always smaller than the 
general peer’s. Even though real conditions are more 
complicated than the simple assumption of our mathematical 
model, the results still confirmed our model’s conclusion that 
the local private-history based credit system of eMule can  
Figure 2.(a)  the number of general peers who complete their downloading jobs when the analysis arrives into a steady state. 
Figure 2.(b)  the number of free riders who complete their downloading jobs when the analysis arrives into an steady state. 
Figure 2.(c)   the ratio of these finished peers to the finished free riders when the analysis arrives into a steady state. 
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Figure 3. The number of peers in the queueing network. When using reward 
policy, general peer’s number in the first several stations is reduced when 
comparing with Figure 4. Solid line: general peers;   Dash line:  free riders 
provide fairness to the general peers and deal with free riders 
effectively. During the tests, the free rider’s download rate 
was high at the beginning, and then reduced as its selfish 
behavior pushed itself into the low position of its neighbors’ 
queues. Meanwhile, the general peer could continuously 
upload and benefit its download rate with the own credit. Thus, 
the free rider always obtained less average download rate than 
the general peer.  
Sometimes the ratio of the download rate of the general 
peer to the free rider is not significant. The potential reason 
are: the system’s capacity is much lager than the customer’s 
request; plenty of general peers completing their jobs still stay 
in the system for contributing; or our free rider client’s 
neighbors have higher upload rates than that of our general 
peer client’s neighbors. Additionally, there remains an open 
question: how should one judge the fairness degree, which 
may relate the ratio of the general peer’s upload rate to its 
download rate?  This question will be addressed in our future 
work.  
C. Comparison with BitTorrent 
The popular peer-to-peer file sharing application 
“BitTorrent”, whose “TFT” incentive algorithm was employed 
for fairness promotion, does not prohibit free riders from 
completing downloads. Free riders can still obtain enough 
bandwidth through two kinds of download channels:  
1) free riders download from the seeds which only provide 
uploads and don’t need to conform to the TFT strategy;  
2) free riders download from the other peers without obeying 
the incentive policy, as each peer periodically unchokes its 
part of the upload slot to randomly chosen peers through 
the “optimistic unchoking” mechanism.  
Research has shown that free riders of BitTorrent could 
receive higher download rates than the general peers in most 
common situations [8].  
On the other hand, a peer’s average download rate in eMule 
is totally decided by the position in the uploading queue of           
Figure 4. The number of peers in the queueing network. When using penalty 
policy, peers accumulated into the first several stations. Solid line: general 
peer;   Dash line:  free riders 
uploaders. This credit-based rule does not only cover the 
general peers, but it theoretically covers the seeds in a long 
time period. Because the general peer always follow the 
credit-based incentive policy and thus get benefit through the 
credit, its average download rate could not be less than the 
free rider’s. Even though the BitTorrent TFT incentive 
algorithm is rate-based, greedy, and its general peers may 
achieve higher download rate than eMule’s, eMule’s credit 
system could more fairly treat general peers and free riders 
from a fairness management perspective.  
V. NEWCOMER ISSUE AND SOLUTION
A.   Newcomer Issue 
When a general peer has just arrived into the system, like a 
typical free rider without any content contributed to others, it 
is not easy to quickly receive its first chunks in the file swarm. 
This case is also called the first-chunk problem in [4] and is 
verified by the peer’s U-shape distribution in the system [3]. 
Thus, there exists an inevitable fairness design issue about 
how to deal with a newcomer who may belong as either a 
general peer or a free rider. Generally, two opposite strategies 
are applied: one is penalizing all kinds of newcomers, while 
the other rewards newcomers. Our model is used to evaluate 
both situations under the steady state. 
  In Fig. 3, the general-peer and free rider populations at each 
service station with different arrival ratios are shown when all 
newcomers are awarded to the high priority queue through 
Pr(0)=1. Fig. 4 shows the similar setup except all newcomers 
are punished to the low priority queue by letting Pr(0)=0.
    These graphs show that the credit system is still effective in 
dealing with free riders during one file exchange. In Fig. 3, 
free riders accumulate around the first several service stations 
even when rewarded with the high priority queue upon first 
arriving in the system. Likewise in Fig. 4, when the penalty 
strategy is employed, there is a prominent growth of the 
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general peers’ population at the first service station S1 when 
the arrival ratio rises. The explanation is that after a general 
peer first arrives into the system, it has not owned any 
exchangeable content and has to stay in the low priority queue 
competing with free riders increment. If the reward policy is 
employed, general peers do not accumulate at the first service 
station and their downloading process will be sped up.  
Current peer-to-peer file sharing applications tend to the 
reward solution: i.e., BitTorrent’s “optimistic unchoking” 
scheme provides some bandwidth to a newcomer, even if this 
introduces unfairness into the system. eMule also adopts a 
similar policy that each newcomer will quickly receive a first 
chunk no matter which type of peer it belongs to.  
B.   Long-time History Improvement 
At issue is the case when a free rider attempts to gain extra 
benefit by pretending to be a newcomer via regularly changing 
its ID.  In this case, both the penalty and reward strategies for 
coping with the newcomer will not continue to keep the 
system fair. Furthermore, this newcomer issue could bring a 
Sybil attack [18] to damage the fairness of a P2P network that 
is based on the global reputation system. Thus, additional, 
complex authentication or a global reputation system based on 
public history is proposed. However, this may aggravate the 
network’s burden due to the large information exchange, or it 
may require a management center as an addition to the 
traditional peer-to-peer structure.  
The current eMule’s fairness implementation is also 
vulnerable to the newcomer issue because of its reward policy 
to newcomers. Moreover, even though eMule uses an easy 
way to distinguish the general peer from the free rider by 
drawing support from the local private history-based credit, 
the evaluation results only show that this rule is useful during 
single file sharing, and we call this single file download period 
a short-time local private history. However, it is difficult for a 
general peer to use its rewarded credit across different file 
downloads. As an example, assume a peer has finished 
downloading a file, after which it leaves the system. Several 
hours later or several days later, it rejoins the system to 
download another file. This raises the question of whether its 
previous earned credit can be guaranteed to use for the current 
download process, especially in case of long term local private 
history. The answer is no, because when a general peer arrives 
as a newcomer, the probability of meeting its neighbors with 
whom there is an existing credit relationship, is close to zero. 
This also causes Pr(0) in our analytic model to be almost zero.
It is due to many uncertain factors, such as:  
1) The large total number of peers in the system as well as the 
relative small number of this general peer’s previous 
neighbors.  
2) Whether its previous neighbors have desirable content?  
3) Whether its neighbors are currently online?  
4) Whether its neighbors want to share their content?  
Hence, the performance of general peers and overall system 
fairness will be strengthened if eMule could increase the  
Figure 5. The number of peers in the queueing network. When using long-
time local private history-based proposal. General peers don’t accumulated 
into the first several stations, and free riders are still punished. Solid line: 
general peers;   Dash line:  free riders. 
probability of newcomers meeting previous downloaders and 
continuously utilizing private credit history. This would also 
increase Pr(0) in our mathematical model. The solution will be 
implemented as follows: During each file exchange process, 
every downloader not only provides credit to its direct 
uploader, but also gives some additional credit to those peers 
who have exchanged this file’s content with the uploader. As 
the downloader not the uploader keeps the credit records [17], 
thus, more general peers besides the direct uploaders will gain 
future transaction benefit and an increased Pr(0) can be 
guarantied. 
The improvement is still local, private history-based, and 
simple. Instead of maintaining private credit between two 
peers, our method will let the credit operations cover more 
general peers with exponential growth, but it doesn’t need to 
calculate a global credit score like the global reputation 
system. It will promote more sharing behaviors, because peers 
will take care of not only short-term behaviors, but their long-
term generous behaviors. This could correspond to a higher 
reward probability during their first chunk downloads in the 
future. On the other hand, our solution following the credit 
policy does not provide any benefit to the free rider even if it 
only repeatedly changes its identity without uploading 
anything. Because general peers are more willing to share 
their contents to earn more incentive credit, the fairness will 
be strengthened and the system’s capacity will be improved. 
This proposal is also tested through the queueing network 
model. Fig. 5 provides numerical analysis results to support 
this idea. The results are shown with a small step of Pr(0)=0.2
for the general peer, which means the increasing probability of 
meeting previous neighbors if following our proposal.  On the 
other hand, we still restrict the free rider’s Pr(0)=0. In Fig. 5, 
the general peer’s populations are very similar to the reward 
policy results shown in Fig. 3, while more free riders as 
newcomers are restrained into the first station comparing with 
Fig. 3. Thus, without losing the benefit of local private 
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history-based credit, our solution can still improve the whole 
system’s fairness as well as extend eMule’s credit validity 
from short-term to long-term. Several design issues still exist 
such as determining the optimal quantity of the additional 
credit. We will focus on them in our future work. 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we both develop a simple queueing network 
model and do experimental study for researching credit 
systems used in peer-to-peer file sharing networks such as 
eMule. The results show that this local-based credit scheme 
could effectively provide fairness for the system in the short-
time history. Our model also reveals the newcomer’s fairness 
problem. After comparing with existing penalty and reward 
strategies, a simple, local, and long-term history-based scheme 
is suggested.  This strategy not only rewards incoming general 
peers having good long-time history records, but it also 
restrains the benefit to free riders even though they repeatedly 
join the system using distinct IDs. Future work will aim to the 
credit’s long history effect for system fairness. The 
experimental study will not restrained by one file downloading 
process, and the same peer ID will be maintained during 
consistent downloading over a long-term period. Another 
research ideas may include how the seeds affect the credit 
policy, and how to judge the fairness degree. 
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